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Abstract
Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most widely used protocols in the
Internet. The main purpose of the DNS protocol is mapping user-friendly domain
names to IP addresses. Unfortunately, many cyber criminals deploy the DNS
protocol for malicious purposes, such as botnet communications. In this type of
attack, the botmasters tunnel communications between the Command and Control
(C&C) servers and the bot-infected machines within DNS request and response.
Designing an effective approach for botnet detection has been done previously
based on specific botnet types Since botnet communications are characterized by
different features, botmasters may evade detection methods by modifying some of
these features. This research aims to design and implement a multi-staged detection
approach for Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), Fast Flux Service Network, and
Domain Flux-based botnets, as well as encrypted DNS tunneled-based botnets using
the BRO Network Security Monitor. This approach is able to detect DNS-based
botnet communications by relying on analyzing different techniques used for finding
the C&C server, as well as encrypting the malicious traffic.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
Cyber-attacks, including malware injection, never stop threatening computer
networks and information systems. One of the predominant forms of spreading
malware is infecting systems with malicious software forcing them to act as botnets.
These botnets often utilize Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to hide their
communication with their Command & Control (C&C) servers. This research aims to
design and implement a multi-staged detection approach for Domain Generation
Algorithm (DGA), Fast Flux Service Network, and Domain Flux-based botnets, as
well as encrypted DNS tunneled-based botnets using BRO Network Security Monitor.
Domain Name System is the Internet’s equivalent of a phone book and a
central part of the Internet, providing a mechanism for naming resources in such a
way that the names are usable in different hosts, networks, protocol families,
internets, and administrative organizations (RFC 883). In other words, DNS
translates more readily memorized domain names to numerical IP addresses needed
for locating and identifying computing devices and services (Domain Name System,
2017).
According to Wikipedia, mapping a simpler and more memorable name to a
numerical address dates back to the ARPANET era (1969-1990). The Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) maintained a text file named HOSTS.TXT to map host
names to the numerical addresses of computers on the ARPANET. Each time a host
had to connect to the network, it would have to download the latest version of the
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table. At that time, the addresses were assigned manually, but by the early 1980s,
keeping a single and centralized host table had turned out to become slow and
unwieldy, creating the need for an automated naming system. The Domain Name
System was created by Paul Mockapetris and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) published the original specifications in RFC 882 and RFC 883 in November
1983 (Domain Name System, 2017).
A botnet, or robot network, is a collection of Internet-connected computers
(bots) that are infected with a specific malware that allows these bots to be remotely
controlled by a Command and Control (C&C) server (What is a Botnet Attack?Definition, n.d.). Although DNS protocol is typically used for benign purposes, it can
be used to port malicious packets. Domain Name System protocol can be abused at
different stages of the communication process with botnets, which may implement
some techniques to circumvent the detection methods.
Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), Fast-Flux Service Network (FFSN),
Domain Flux1, Double Flux, and DNS tunneling can be used as evasion techniques in
botnet communications (Dietrich et al., 2011; Farnham & Atlasis, 2013; Lysenko,
Pomorova, Savenko, Kryshchuk, & Bobrovnikova, 2015). In DGA, a large number of
short-lived domain names are generated. While the DNS A-record (IP address) for a
specific malicious domain name changes frequently in FFSN, the DF changes the
C&C server’s domain name repeatedly by implementing short TTL period. With DNS

1

DF will be used in this document to refer to Domain Flux.
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tunneling, botnet communications with C&C servers can be wrapped and tunneled
through DNS packets.
BRO Network Security Monitor is a powerful and open-source network
analysis framework (The Bro Network Security Monitor, n.d.). The initial version of
BRO was designed and implemented by Vern Paxson in 1995. BRO focuses on
network security monitoring, and provides a comprehensive platform for more
general network traffic analysis tasks even outside of the security domain, including
performance measurements and helping with troubleshooting.
BRO is not a classic signature-based intrusion detection system (IDS). While it
supports such standard functionality as well, BRO supports a wide range of analyses
through its scripting language which indeed facilitates a much broader spectrum of
very different approaches to finding malicious activity, including semantic misuse
detection, anomaly detection, and behavioral analysis (Bro Introduction, n.d.).
Problem Statement
Different botnets implement different protocols to communicate with C&C
servers. As the Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the least monitored protocols
from a security perspective, many cyber criminals abuse DNS to tunnel botnet
communications, and some of the tunneling tools may encrypt the payload to evade
detection. According to Dietrich et al. (2011), "DNS is usually one of the few
protocols- if not the only one- that is allowed to pass without further ado" (p. 10), thus
making it an attractive means of botnet tunneling. Furthermore, many botnet
detection methods can be evaded by some techniques such as DGA, FFSN, and DF
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(Lysenko et al., 2015). This makes the detection and prevention efforts more
complicated.
Domain Name System protocol can be abused at different stages of the botnet
communication process, such as finding the C&C server, transmitting data, and/or
controlling the bots. At the initial stage of botnet communication, a bot tries to find its
C&C server by sending DNS requests to resolve the domain name(s) of the malicious
server. After finding the C&C server, the communications between C&C server and
the bot start. These communications may include data exfiltration, data infiltration, or
controlling the bot to perform malicious actions against other systems.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Botnets have become one of the most significant concerns on the Internet.
"According to a report from Russian-based Kaspersky Labs, botnets–not spam,
viruses, or worms … pose the biggest threat to the Internet. A report from Symantec
came to a similar conclusion" (Newman, 2010). Botnet malware can be used against
any Internet connected device, including smart televisions, to execute a wide range
of malicious actions. These actions include launching a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS), phishing, generating and sending spam messages, propagating malware,
sniffing information, hosting malicious content, and using infected bots for proxy
activities (Bots and Botnets–A Growing Threat, 2016). Table 1 shows some malicious
activities that are executed against or by botnet-infected machines.
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Table 1
Variety of Botnet Automated Activities

•

Data exfiltration against

Data infiltration against

Activities performed by

bots

bots

bots

Stealing sensitive
information

•
•

Installing malware
Sending spams

•
•
•

Lunching DoS
Click fraud
Proxy activities

The resiliency and dynamic nature of botnets pose challenges to detection
methods, like when the botmasters change the botnets’ characteristics to avoid
detection methods. Designing and implementing a detection mechanism for DNSbased botnets will rely on analysis of botnet features, and implementation of
detection methods and existing evasion techniques.
Objective of the Study
Using BRO Network Security Monitor, the main objective of this study is to
design and implement an effective detection technique for DNS-based botnets using
rule-based and signature-based techniques in two phases. The first phase will
implement a rule-based mechanism to detect the existence of DGA, FFSN, or DF
based botnets, which are utilized to find the C&C server. The second phase will
implement a signature-based mechanism to detect DNS tunneling, which is utilized to
wrap malicious traffic in DNS packets.
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Limitations of the Study
This study required a group of real botnet-infected machines and C&C servers.
Network traffic of previously infected machines were used for analysis and design of
the proposed detection mechanism of the DGA, FFSN, and DF implementations.
Definition of Terms
Table 2
Definition of Terms Used in This Document
Term
Authoritative
Name Server (NS)

Botmaster

Botnet (Zombie
Army)

Command and
Control Server
(C&C)

Covert Channel

Distributed
Denial of Service

Definition
A name server that provides actual, original and definitive answer to DNS
queries such as – mail server IP address (MX resource record) or web
site IP address (A resource record). It does not provide just cached
answers that were obtained from another name server.
What Is Authoritative Name Server? (2009, August 17). Retrieved March
25, 2017, from https://www.dnsknowledge.com/whatis/authoritativenameserver/
A person who operates the command and control of botnets for remote
process execution.
DDoS Attack Definitions - DDoSPedia. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017,
from https://security.radware.com/ddosknowledgecenter/ddospedia/botmaster/
An interconnected network of computers infected with malware without the
user's knowledge and controlled by cybercriminals.
What is a Botnet Attack? - Definition. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017,
from https://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-securitycenter/threats/botnetattacks#.WN3sKYWcE2w
A computer that controls and issues commands to members of a botnet.
Botnet members may be referred to zombies and the botnet itself may be
referred to as a zombie army.
What is command-and-control servers (C&C center)? - Definition from
WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/command-andcontrol-server-CCserver
A mechanism for sending and receiving information data between
machines without alerting any firewalls and IDS’s on the network.
IDFAQ: What is covert channel and what are some examples?
(n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from https://www.sans.org/securityresources/idfaq/what-is-covertchannel-and-what-are-some-examples/2/17
A type of DoS attack where multiple compromised systems, which are
often infected with a Trojan, are used to target a single system causing a
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DNS Tunneling

Domain Flux (DF)

Domain
Generation
Algorithm (DGA)

Double Flux

Dynamic Domain
Name System
(DDNS)

Fast Flux or Single
Flux (FFSN)

Metamorphic and
polymorphic malware

Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Victims of a DDoS attack consist of both
the end targeted system and all systems maliciously used and controlled
by the hacker in the distributed attack.
Beal, V. (n.d.). DDoS attack - Distributed Denial of Service. Retrieved
March 25, 2017, from
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DDoS_attack.html
The ability to encode the data of other programs or protocols in DNS
queries and responses.
What is DNS Tunneling? (2017, January 04). Retrieved March 25, 2017,
from https://www.plixer.com/blog/networksecurity-forensics/what-is-dnstunneling/
A technique for keeping a malicious botnet in operation by constantly
changing the domain name of the botnet owner's
Command and Control (C&C) server.
What is domain fluxing? - Definition from WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved
March 25, 2017, from
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/domain-fluxing
A class of algorithm that takes a seed as an input, outputs a string and
appends a top-level domain (TLD) such as .com, .ru, .uk, etc. in order to
form a possible domain name. The seed is a piece of information
accessible to both the botmaster and the infected host now acting as a bot.
Why Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs)? -. (2016, August 17).
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from http://blog.trendmicro.com/domaingenerating-algorithms-dgas/
A DNS technique used by botnets to provide an additional layer of
redundancy by changing the DNS A-records and authoritative NS-records
continually for malicious domain using the round robin algorithm.
Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. (2015, February 13).
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fastflux-networks-workingdetection-part-1/#gref
A method of automatically updating a name server in the Domain Name
System (DNS), often in real time, with the active DDNS configuration of its
configured hostnames, addresses or other information.
Dynamic DNS. (2017, February 18). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_DNS
A DNS technique used by botnets to associate a single domain name with
many IP addresses and to hide phishing and malware delivery sites behind
an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies.
Fast flux. (2017, March 20). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_flux
Two categories of malicious software programs that have the ability to
change their code as they propagate. With polymorphism, each time the
bot binary propagates, it encrypts its original code to avoid pattern
recognition. Instead of the code encryption, metamorphism changes the
code to an equivalent one each time.
What is metamorphic and polymorphic malware? - Definition from
WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved March 26, 2017, from
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Network Address
Translation (NAT)

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/metamorphicandpolymorphic-malware
The process where a network device, usually a firewall, assigns a public
address to a computer (or group of computers) inside a private network.
The main use of NAT is to limit the number of public IP addresses an
organization or company must use, for both economy and security
purposes.
What is Network Address Translation (NAT)? (n.d.). Retrieved
March 25, 2017, from http://whatismyipaddress.com/nat

Resource
Records

Single Flux

Zombie

The data elements that define the structure and content of the domain
name space. All DNS operations are ultimately
formulated in terms of resource records.
Resource Records. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from
http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Course/Section2/8.htm
The simplest type of fast flux, characterized by multiple individual nodes
within the network registering and de-registering their IP addresses as
part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single domain name. This
combines round robin DNS with very short time to live - usually less than
five minutes - to create a constantly changing list of destination
addresses for that single DNS name. Fast flux. (2017, March 08).
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_flux#Single-flux_and_doubleflux
A computer connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a
hacker, computer virus or Trojan horse program, and can be used to
perform malicious tasks of one sort or another under remote direction.
Zombie (computer science). (2017, March 22). Retrieved March
25, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zombie_(computer_science)

Summary
This chapter covered an introduction about botnets and their significance.
Also, DNS protocol and how it is abused in favor of botnet communication, as well as
some common evasion techniques used to circumvent botnet-detection methods.
The next chapter provides an overview of botnets, more details about DNS-based
botnet-detection methods and evasion techniques with a detailed review of existing
literature.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
Botnets use various communication protocols to tunnel and hide themselves
from detection. Also, they may use encryption techniques to encrypt the tunnel itself.
These evasion techniques complicate the detection process.
Research communities have proposed many different approaches for botnet
detection. Many of these approaches are based on a specific type of botnet. Studying
and analyzing different botnet features, implemented detection approaches, and
evasion techniques will be helpful in designing and implementing a new approach for
detecting DNS-based botnets at different stages of communications.
Background Related to the Problem
Most computers that are co-opted to serve in botnet are often home-based
and are inadequately protected by an effective firewall or other safeguard (Rouse,
2012). According to Trend Micro, the two pieces of malware that started the botnet
usage were Sub7 and Pretty Park–a Trojan and a Worm, respectively
(CounterMeasures–A Security Blog, 2010). These malwares introduced the concept
of a victim machine connecting to an IRC channel to listen for malicious commands.
These two pieces of malware first surfaced in 1999 and botnet innovation has been
constant since then. Steadily, botnets migrated away from the original IRC Command
& Control (C&C) channel to communicate over HTTP, ICMP, SSL, and DNS ports,
often using custom protocols.
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Botnet structure has evolved over time to evade detection and disruption. Bots
are traditionally constructed as clients which communicate via central servers.
Theses bots connect to one or more servers through one or more domains, allowing
the botmaster to perform with total control from a remote location. The centralized
C&C model introduces a single point of failure; if the C&C domain is identified and
dismantled, the botmaster loses control over the entire botnet (Antonakakis et al.,
2012). To solve the problem of security, researchers and authorities target botnet
domains and C&C servers. Many recent botnets now rely on peer-to-peer networks
to communicate. These P2P bot programs perform the same actions as the clientserver model without the need for a central server to communicate (Botnet, 2017).
In a peer-to-peer model, incoming connections to computers–that are behind a
Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway, firewall, or proxy server–cannot be
established. This would prevent most bots being connected to by other bots. In a
client-server model, this obviously is not a problem as the bots connect to the server,
so a peer-to-peer network still requires servers in a way (Peer-to-Peer Botnets for
Beginners, 2016).
Bots that are not behind a proxy / NAT / firewall can accept incoming
connections and act as servers. These bots are usually referred to as nodes or
peers, whereas the bots that do not accept incoming connections are usually referred
to as workers. In a peer-to-peer model, the workers connect to one or more nodes to
receive command(s). These nodes are technically servers, and the workers are
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distributed between many nodes. This scenario allows the workers to shift to another
node if one is dismantled.
Peer-to-Peer botnets present more challenges for detection authorities; it is
impractical to take all the nodes down since the nodes are legitimate devices. They
cannot simply be seized like a server would be (Peer-to-Peer Botnets for Beginners,
2016). Figure 1 shows the two communication models: client-server model between
workers and C&C server and peer-to-peer model between nodes and workers.

Figure 1. Botnet architectures.
Botnets core components include C&C server(s) and zombies. Upon
successful infection, the infected machine tries to connect to the C&C server at the
initial stage. There are different ways to find the C&C server: a) the IP address or the
domain name of the C&C server is hard coded in the malware, b) the malware
implements Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), c) the malware implements FastFlux Service Network (FFSN), or d) the malware implements Domain Flux (DF). In
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the hard coding implementation, it is easy for defenders, upon botnet discovery, to
block a specific IP address or domain name. However, with DGA, it is difficult to block
tens of thousands of unpredictable generated domain names, and the problem
becomes more complicated when implementing DGA, FFSN, and DF together, thus,
the traditional blacklisting technique based on the IP address or domain name is
ineffective, and it is difficult to trace a large number of nodes ready to register their IP
addresses to a domain name(s).
A botnet that implements DGA generates tens of thousands of domain names
per day. These domains are short-lived and blacklists will not be effective. As
generated domains are predictable to the botmaster, they need to register only one of
the domains to initiate C&C connection, whereas defenders need to block any
generated domains that are registered to completely eliminate C&C activity (Hagen &
Luo, 2016).
In FFSN, the basic concept is having multiple IP addresses associated with a
single domain name, and then constantly changing them in quick succession. If one
or more of them drop, others quickly take their place (Albors, 2017). Figure 2 shows
how botmasters use bots (flux agents) to act as proxies to the C&C server.
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Figure 2: Fast-Flux service network.
Using FFSN, a domain name resolves different IP addresses depending on
the exact time in which the petition is made, which enables the decentralization of the
C&C servers and complicates unraveling the structure of the botnet. To carry out the
IP resolution changes, these domains have very low TTL in the cache, which forces
the DNS systems to frequently refresh the resolution cache of the IP addresses
associated to the domain. In the case of a null TTL, the resolution is not even stored.
Therefore, those DNS petitions whose TTL is low are suspicious (Cantón, 2015).
Table 3 illustrates the Concept of Domain Flux.
Table 3
Domain Flux Implementation
Time

IP Address

Domain Name

T1

1.1.1.1 3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

botnet.com

T2

1.1.1.1 3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

malicious.com

T3

1.1.1.1 3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

C&C.com

T4

1.1.1.1 3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

suspicious.com
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In DF, the botnets evade the detection by implementing short TTL periods and
cycling of IP mappings for the domain name of C&C-servers (Lysenko et al., 2015).
Table 4 illustrates the concept of FFSN and DF combination. The DF can be
implemented along with DGA or can be utilized by instructing bot(s)–already
connected–to request different domains next time.
Table 4
FFSN & DF Implementation
Time

IP Address

Domain Name

T1

1.1.1.1 5.5.5.5

botnet.com

T2

3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

malicious.com

T3

2.2.2.2 9.9.9.9

C&C.com

T4

3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

botnet.com

T5

1.1.1.1 5.5.5.5

C&C.com

T6

2.2.2.2 9.9.9.9

malicious.com

T7

3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

C&C.com

T8

2.2.2.2 9.9.9.9

botnet.com

T9

1.1.1.1 5.5.5.5

malicious.com

T10

3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

malicious.com

T11

2.2.2.2 9.9.9.9

botnet.com

T12

3.3.3.3 7.7.7.7

C&C.com

In DNS tunneling, a botmaster can abuse the Domain Name Service protocol,
if the DNS traffic is not restricted, to establish a C&C channel between the bot(s) and
the C&C server. These channels are difficult to detect and block. Some DNS
tunneling tools support SSH, such as Iodine and DNS2TCP. These tools can be
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utilized to encrypt botnet communications to complicate traffic inspection. Figure 3
shows how a bot communicates with a C&C server through DNS tunnel.

Figure 3. DNS tunneling.
Literature Review
Dynamic domain generation, fluxing, and tunneling techniques have been
used by different malware families to avoid detection and complicate mitigation
efforts. Research communities have proposed many different approaches and
mechanisms for the development of the botnet-detection techniques. Many of these
approaches are effective for specific types of botnet.
Bilge, Sen, Balzarotti, Kirda, and Kruegel (2011) identified a feature vector with
15 different features for malicious domain detection. These features are classified
into four feature sets:
1. Time-Based Features.
2. DNS Answer-Based Features.
3. TTL Value-Based Features.
4. Domain Name-Based Features.
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Table 5 shows that each feature set has a different feature for malicious
domain detection.
Table 5
Feature Vector (Bilge et al., 2011)
Feature Set
Time-Based Feature

Feature Name
1234-

DNS Answer-Based Features5678-

Short life
Daily Similarity
Repeating patterns
Access ratio
Number of distinct IP addresses
Number of distinct countries
Number of domains share the IP with
Reverse DNS query results

TTL Value-Based Features 9- Average TTL
10- Standard Deviation of TTL
11- Number of distinct TTL values
12- Number of TTL change
13- Percentage usage of specific TTL ranges
Domain Name-Based Features
14- Percentages of numerical characters
15- Percentage of the length of the LMS

Krmíček (2011) examined the NetFlow1 of DNS IP traffic and its relation to the
botnet presence in the monitored network. He studied the DNS behavior of known
malicious and benign domains based on features identified by Bilge, Sen, Balzarotti,
Kirda, and Kruegel (2011). Since NetFlow inspects only packet headers, not the

1

(p. 1).

Unidirectional sequence of packets with some common properties that pass through a network device.
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entire packet payload, Krmíček concluded that "using NetFlow data solely, for the
purpose of botnet detection is not possible" (p. 8), and he mentioned that extracting
important information from the packet payload is the most promising approach for
botnet detection.
Choi, Lee, and Kim (2007) proposed a botnet detection mechanism by
monitoring DNS traffic, which forms a group activity in DNS requests simultaneously
sent by many distributed bots. Upon successful infection, the bots rally to a C&C
server at an early stage. In other words, the bots will have to register with the C&C
server. If the IP address of the C&C server in not hard coded, the bots use DNS in a
rallying process, and the DNS traffic has unique features defined as group activity
(Domain Names & Timestamps). Their mechanism uses the information of IP
headers to detect botnets, irrespective of the protocol used.
Choi et al. (2007) developed a mechanism to detect C&C server migration,
where a botnet frequently changes its C&C server–to avoid dismantling–by migrating
to a candidate C&C server using DDNS. The authors summarized the differences
between botnet DNS traffic and legitimate DNS traffic in Table 6.
Table 6
Differences between Botnet and Legitimate DNS
Source IPs accessed
to domain name

Activity

Appearance
pattern

DNS Type

Botnet DNS

Fixed size (Botnet
members)

Group
activity

Intermittently

Usually DDNS

Legitimate DNS

Anonymous
(Legitimate users)

Non-group
activity

Randomly and
continuously

Usually DNS
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There are some limitations to this mechanism: monitoring a huge scale of
networks poses high processing times and presents significant problems. Also, their
algorithms can be evaded when the botnet uses DNS only at initializing and never
again (moreover, do not migrate the botnet). Furthermore, since their mechanism is
based on the similarity of group activity, this makes it not suitable for detecting small
numbers of infected machines in a monitored network.
Dietrich et al. (2011) are the first to document DNS-based botnet C&C traffic.
They presented a technique for DNS-based C&C traffic detection and another
technique for malware sample classification based on their behavior. Their work is
based on the high entropy of C&C messages generated by Feederbots; they utilized
the fact that encrypted or compressed messages have high entropy.
A limitation of their technique is that, for certain resource records, the
distribution of byte values could be compared against the expected distribution (e.g.,
rdata of A RR contains IPv4 addresses). However, the IPv4 address space is not
uniformly distributed (e.g., reserved addresses, such as private addresses or
multicast addresses, might rarely show up in Internet DNS traffic), whereas other
addresses, such as popular websites, might appear more often in DNS query results.
Another limitation is that:
Botmasters could restrict their C&C messages to very small sizes. In practice,
message content could be stored in, e.g., 4 bytes of an A resource record’s
rdata. In this case, our rdata features alone, which are applied to individual
C&C message would not be able to detect these C&C messages as high
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entropy messages because the statistical byte entropy of really short
messages is very low, and our estimate of the alphabet size by counting the
number of distinct byte is inaccurate for very short messages. (p. 15)
Lysenko et al. (2015) proposed a DNS-based anti-evasion technique for botnet
detection. Their technique is based on a cluster analysis of the features obtained
from the payload of incoming DNS messages. The method uses the semi-supervised
fuzzy c-means clustering. Figure 4 illustrates the functioning principle of the DNSbased anti-evasion technique for botnet detection.

Figure 4. Functioning principle of the DNS-based anti-evasion technique for botnet
detection (Lysenko et al., 2015).
According to Lysenko et al. (2015), their technique can detect fast flux, domain
flux, cycling of IP mappings, and DNS tunneling evasion techniques with high
efficiency. They claimed that passive analysis of DNS traffic leads to the detection of
only particular malware.
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Jin, Ichise, and Iida (2015) designed a botnet communication detection
method by collecting authoritative NS records and their IP addresses, as well as
monitoring direct outbound DNS queries. Their method is based on storing NS
records with corresponding IP addresses of valid query response pairs, IP addresses
of public DNS servers, and ISP specified DNS servers in a NS-IP database. Any
destination IP address is not included in the previously achieved Name Server NS
records, as well as its corresponding IP Address; a record is considered suspicious
and should be investigated. In this way, "all unusual domain name resolution that
uses direct outbound DNS query can be monitored" (p. 39).
A DNS tunneling technique could evade their method. Domain Name System
tunneling can be used for a more robust C&C configuration. For example, a
botmaster could register the malicious domain name and designate the system
running dnscat2 server software as the authoritative DNS server for that domain. In
this way, the bot machine would issue a DNS query for that malicious domain to the
victim’s trusted DNS server, which would forward the query to the C&C server and
return the adversary’s answer to the bot. In this scenario, the protected network can
only access the trusted DNS server, but that DNS server can contact external DNS
servers to resolve queries that it cannot resolve directly (Zeltser, 2016). Since the
returned malicious answer is from an authoritative DNS server, it would be stored in
the NS-IP whitelist database, resulting in false-negative alert.
Holz, Gorecki, Rieck, and Freiling (2008) presented the first empirical study of
FFSNs. They developed a metric that exploits the principles of FFSNs to derive an
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effective mechanism for detecting new fast-flux domains in an automated way. They
showed that the method is accurate, and they had very low false-positive and falsenegative rates. Based on their empirical observations, they found other information
(e.g., whois lookups and MX records) as promising features for an extended version
of their flux-score.
Caglayan, Toothaker, Drapeau, Burke, and Eaton (2009) presented the first
empirical study of detecting and classifying fast flux service networks (FFSNs) in real
time. Their approach uses active and passive sensors derived from DNS monitoring
and fusing the component sensors using a Bayesian classifier. The Fast Flux Monitor
Architecture can detect single and double flux behavior in real time with acceptable
false alarm rates.
Dabbagh (2012) proposed a method for detecting IP ID and TTL covert
channels. He proposed a method based on his observation that "operating systems
choose initially a random number for the ID in the IP header and then increment it
sequentially" (p. 1). He concluded that a packet is suspicious if the new packet has
an IP ID smaller than the previous packets. Also, he stated that "detecting TTL covert
channel is based on the fact that the network is stable" (p. 2). Therefore, the receiver
side should not observe many variations in the TTL values in the IP header of the
packets that are coming from the same source.
A limitation of this method is when using NAT services, packets coming from
different sources will have different IDs and TTL values, but will have the same
source IP. Another limitation is that some IP stacks assign the ID values of the IP
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header by using a pseudo-random generator (RFC 4413-TCP/IP Field Behavior,
2006).
Zhang, Papadopoulos, and Massey (2013) made an initial attempt to
investigate detection of encrypted communication. Since the encryption increases
entropy, they presented two high-entropy classifiers and used one of them to
enhance the BotHunter, and showed that BotHunter was able to detect encrypted
bots.
Antonakakis et al. (2012) presented a novel detection system, called Pleiades,
which is able to detect machines within a monitored network that are compromised
with DGA-based botnets. Pleiades monitors traffic below the local recursive DNS
server and analyzes streams of unsuccessful DNS resolutions (Name Error or
NXDomain Responses). Pleiades searches for relatively large clusters of NXDomains
with similar syntactic features, and are queried by multiple, potentially compromised,
machines during a specific epoch. As shown in Figure 5, there are two phases of
detection: the first phase discovers the presence of DGA and the second classifies
the discovered DGA and detects the C&C domain(s).

Figure 5. A High-Level Overview of Pleiades (Antonakakis et al., 2012).
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Antonakakis et al. (2012) claimed that "Pleiades was able to identify six DGAs
that belong to known malware families and six new DGAs never reported before" (p.
14). Although their claim that Pleiades can achieve very high detection accuracy, one
limitation of their evaluation method is "the exact enumeration of the number of
infected hosts in the ISP network" (p. 14). Because the location of monitoring sensors
is below the recursive DNS server, they can only obtain a lower bound estimate of
infected hosts. For example, an IP address that generates DNS traffic may be a NAT,
firewall, DNS server, or other device that behaves as a proxy. Also, noisy
NXDomains may be generated to mislead the implementation of Pleiades.
Yadav and Reddy (2012) proposed methodologies for utilizing failed domain
names (NXDOMAIN) in the quest for rapid detection of a fluxing botnet’s C&C server.
They validated their method by detecting Conficker botnets and other anomalies with
a false positive rate as low as 0.02%. Their technique can be applied at the edge of
an autonomous system for real-time detection. Since their method is based on
detecting botnets utilizing high entropy, botnet owners may alter the way domain
names are created to evade their detection mechanism.
Farnham and Atlasis (2013) reviewed several utilities used to enable tunneling
over DNS. They discussed practical techniques for detecting DNS tunneling and
categorized the detection techniques into two categories: payload detection
technique, which is used to detect specific DNS tunneling utilities, and traffic
analysis-based technique, which is used to detect DNS tunneling in general. In the
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payload analysis, they discussed the following techniques for DNS tunneling
detection:
1. Size of DNS request and response.
2. Entropy of hostnames.
3. Statistical analysis.
4. Uncommon record types.
5. Policy violation.
6. Specific signatures.
In traffic analysis, they discussed the following techniques:
1. Volume of DNS traffic per IP address.
2. Volume of DNS traffic per domain.
3. Number of hostnames per domain.
4. Geographical location of DNS server.
5. Domain history.
6. Volume of NXDomain responses.
7. Visualization.
8. Orphan DNS requests.
9. General covert channel detection.
In this research, the NXDomain error will be utilized in a different way to detect
the DGA implementations; the threshold relies on the percentages of the unique
NXDomain errors to the total number DNS requests within an epoch. Although the
DNS Server Failure error is not limited to the FFSN and DF implementations, this
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error can be utilized to detect FFSN- and DF-based botnets. In other words, the first
stage will utilize NXDomain and Server Failure errors to detect the rallying to a C&C
server.
In the second phase, although polymorphism and metamorphism techniques
change the form of each instance of bot binary to circumvent signature-based
detection during the detection and investigative process, the algorithm will use a
detection technique relying on a signature matching based on encoded SSH
handshakes within DNS tunnels.
Summary
This chapter presented an overview of botnets implementation, as well as
some detection methods and evasion techniques. The next chapter proposes a
defense-in-depth approach for DNS-based botnets.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
Implementing a comprehensive, holistic approach for botnet detection could be
a challenging task. Botnets implement different protocols, different architecture, and
can evade detection methods by tunneling their communications within a range of
services, DNS being the most predominant.
Since the DNS protocol can be used at different stages of botnet
communication, I have used BRO Network Security Monitor (NSM) to design and
implement a detection mechanism for DNS-based botnets communication.
Design of the Study
This thesis proposes an empirical solution to design and implements a
mechanism for detecting DNS-based botnets at different stages:
1. Rallying stage when finding the C&C server (DGA, FFSN, and DF).
2. Transmitting data and controlling the bots (DNS Tunnel).
Currently, botnets implement DGA and/or fluxing techniques to avoid botnets
detection and mitigation. The infected machine sends a high volume of DNS requests
in order to find its C&C server.
As a botmaster only registers one or a few domain names (previously known)
to carry out the C&C communication, almost all the DNS requests, generated by
DGA, sent to find the C&C server will have unsuccessful resolutions (name error or
NXDomain responses). The detection of DGA implementation was configured based
on a threshold of NXDomain responses within an epoch. For example, if the infected
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machine sends more than 100 DNS requests within an hour, and a specific
percentage of these requests have unsuccessful resolutions, BRO NSM will detect
the presence of DGA based botnet.
In FFSN and DF based botnets, the malicious domain name(s) that has/have
very low TTL forces the DNS systems to frequently refresh the resolution cache of
the IP addresses associated with the domain(s). Although the DNS Server Failure
can be related to issues other than fluxing implementations, these unsuccessful
resolutions of very low TTL domain names (Server Failure) can be utilized for FFSNand DF-based botnets detection. In other words, the detection of FFSN and DF
implementation was configured based on a threshold of the "Server Failure"
responses within an epoch.
The frequency of malicious DNS packets can be controlled by the botmaster to
evade the detection threshold. In other words, in case the first BRO mechanism fails
to detect DGA, FFSN, or DF presence, another mechanism will run. The second
mechanism inspects the DNS payloads for DNS-encrypted tunnels based on SSH
connections, also implemented with BRO NSM.
According to Brandhorst and Pras (2006) on their statistical analysis of name
server traffic, the percentages of NXDomain errors and Server Failures were 8.74%
and 1.28%, respectively, of the DNS queries. Figure 6 shows DNS statistics at four
locations.
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Figure 6. DNS statistics (Brandhorst & Pras, 2006).

Figure 7. Multistage detection technique for DNS-based botnets.1

1

NXD refers to NXDomain errors and SF refers to Server Failure errors.
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Figure 7 depicts the flowchart for the proposed algorithm. Domain Name
System traffic is inspected at both stages, in parallel, to detect the multistage
communications of DNS-based botnets. The first stage detects the rallying to a C&C
server and the second stage inspects each DNS reply of specific patterns of SSH
handshakes within DNS tunnels.
In the first stage of botnet communication (rallying stage), a DGA-detection
mechanism is applied every 30 minutes to find if total number of DNS requests is 10
or greater. In this case, two thresholds are used for the unique NXDomain errors: the
first threshold, which is 8% of the total number of DNS requests, is based on Figure 6
and used if the total number of DNS requests is 50 or more. The second threshold
(40%) is used if the total number of DNS requests is between 10 and 50. The second
threshold is utilized to eliminate false positive detections in idle systems. For
example, an idle system running DGA has a higher percentage of unique NXDomain
errors to the total number of DNS requests than the percentage in an active system
running DGA. In both thresholds, at least four unique NXDomain errors are required
for DGA detection.
In fluxing detection, which is another method for rallying, different thresholds
are set. The fluxing detection mechanism is applied every 30 minutes if the total
number of DNS requests is 8 or greater. In this mechanism, two thresholds are used
for the Server Failure errors. If the total number of DNS requests is 50 or greater, the
first threshold is used, which is 6% of the total number of DNS requests. The second
threshold (26%) is used if the total number of DNS requests is between 8 and 50.
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Similar to the DGA mechanism, the second threshold is utilized to eliminate falsepositive detection in idle systems implementing fluxing techniques. In both
thresholds, at least three Server Failure errors are required for fluxing detection.
The DNS threshold, which is 50 DNS requests every 30 minutes, is set below
the lowest average in Figure 6 (location 1 has an average of 137 DNS requests per
hour). Since location 1 in Figure 6 has a high percentage of NXDomain errors (33%),
which indicates a high possibility of DGA existence, the NXDomain threshold (8%) is
set based on the lowest average of NXDomain errors (location 3). To eliminate falsenegative detection, the Server Failure threshold (6%) is set higher than the Server
Failure percentage in location 2.
In other words, different threshold values are set for DGA and fluxing
detection, based on the DNS statistics in Figure 6, as well as the activity of the
infected systems. For example, the percentage of NXDomain errors to the total
number of DNS requests depends on the frequency of DGA and the average number
of DNS requests on different systems. Thus, these values need to be dynamically
adjusted with the changing nature of communication.
Data Collection
Instead of real-time monitoring with real botnet malware, the dataset was
collected from the Stratosphere Lab, which is a part of the Malware Capture Facility
Project at CVUT University, Prague, Czech Republic (Garcia, 2015). The lab has a
significant dataset of malware traffic captures, including different types of botnets.
These datasets were used for DGA, FFSN, and DF detection.
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Regarding DNS encrypted tunnels, Iodine and DNS2TCP were used to setup
a SSH tunnel between the server and client device. The captured traffic was used for
SSH connection detection.
Data Analysis
In order to implement and analyze the proposed approach, the following
software, tools, and techniques were required:
1. BRO Network Security Monitor: intrusion detection system.
2. Iodine & DNS2TCP: DNS tunneling tools that support SSH.
3. Wireshark: traffic analyzer.
4. Security Onion: a customized Linux operating system for intrusion
detection.
5. AWS Ubuntu machines: C&C server and infected machine.
6. Registered Domain Name.
Summary
This chapter covered the proposed detection methodology for DNS-based
botnets. This methodology is built on a BRO Network Security Monitor to detect both
DGA- and FFSN-based botnets according to thresholds within an epoch of
NXDomain and Server Failure responses, respectively. Also, the proposed
methodology detects DNS-encrypted tunnels through analyzing connection
establishment within a DNS payload. The next chapter presents more detail about
data collection and analysis.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
Different malicious traffic captures were collected from previously infected
systems. These captures were used for DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based botnet
analysis. For SSH connections tunneled in DNS packets, Iodine and DNS2TCP (with
SSH connections) captures were used for packet analysis.
Data Presentation
In this section, the Wireshark packet captures were presented as the following:
1. Packet capture of DGA-based botnet. This capture was collected from a
previously infected system and was used to test the BRO detection method for DGAbased botnets. The complete capture can be found at Wireshark–DGA-based Botnet.
2. Packet capture of FFSN- & DF-based botnet. This capture was collected
from a previously infected system and was used to test the BRO detection method for
FFSN- and DF-based botnets. The complete capture can be found at Wireshark–
FFSN- & DF-based Botnet.
3. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in Iodine. Iodine is a DNS
tunneling program that tunnels IPv4 data through a DNS server. It was developed by
Bjorn Anderson and Erik Ekman. Iodine can be usable when the Internet access is
firewalled, but DNS queries are allowed. Iodine is written in C and it runs on Linux,
Mac OS X, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, and Windows (Anderson & Ekman, 2014).
The packet capture of Iodine traffic was collected from the lab implementation.
In this lab, the Iodine server and Iodine client were setup as the following:
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•

Iodine server static IP address 52.52.65.253

•

Iodine client IP address 172.31.36.28

•

Subdomain tunnel.ialabs.net

•

Server’s tunnel interface IP address 192.168.250.1

•

Client’s tunnel interface IP address 192.168.250.2

The complete lab steps can be found in Appendix B.
4. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in DNS2TCP. DNS2TCP is
a network tool designed to relay TCP connections through DNS traffic. DNS2TCP
was written by Olivier Dembour with the contributions of Nicolas Collignon. The
encapsulation is done on the TCP level. DNS2TCP is composed of two parts: a
server-side tool and a client-side tool. The server has a list of resources specified in a
configuration file. Each resource is a local or remote service listening for TCP
connections. The client listens on a predefined TCP port and relays each incoming
connection through DNS to the final service (HSC, 2012).
The packet capture of DNS2TCP traffic was also collected from the lab
implementation. In this lab, the two sides–the server and the client–were setup as the
following:
•

DNS2TCP server static IP address 52.52.65.253

•

DNS2TCP client IP address 172.31.36.28

•

Subdomain tunnel2.ialabs.net

The complete lab steps can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 8. Iodine and DNS2TCP lab.
Figure 8 shows the lab implementation of Iodine and DNS2TCP tunneling
tools. The system is protected by a firewall that blocks all traffic except DNS on port
UDP/53.
Data Analysis
The packet captures of the previous section were analyzed as the following:
1. Packet capture of DGA implementation. Figure 9 shows the statistics of
DNS packets. The "No such name" packets represent the total number of DNS
responses that return with a NXDomain error. There were 352,756 responses with
NXDomain error; these responses represented 46.75% of the total DNS packets
(queries and responses), and 89% of the total requests (532,756/398,397). The "No
error" packets represent both the total number of DNS requests and the successful
responses.
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Figure 9. DNS packets statistics–DGA-based botnet.
The previous capture shows a high presence of DGA implementation. Setting
a threshold for DGA detection varies from one network to another. For example,
when implementing a DGA botnet, botmasters can control the frequency of DNS
requests to avoid detection, thus, a high threshold of NXDomain errors can be
evaded by a low frequency (false negative), however, a very low threshold may result
in false-positive detection, such as typing errors. To eliminate the chance of
NXDomain errors due to mistyping or other errors not related to the DGA
implementation, the threshold was set based on unique NXDomain records.
Figure 10 shows DGA-based botnet traffic. After many unsuccessful
resolutions, the infected system found the IP address of a C&C server at packet
number 234,427.
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Figure 10. Wireshark packet capture of DGA-based botnet.
2. Packet capture of FFSN & DF implementation. Similar to the previous
statistics, Figure 11 shows the statistics of DNS packets. The "Server Failure"
packets represent the total number of DNS responses that return a Server Failure
error. There were 159 responses with Server Failure errors; these responses
represented 26.07% of the total DNS packets (queries and responses), and 52.13%
of the total requests (159/305).

Figure 11. DNS packets statistics–FFSN & DF-based botnet.
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This capture shows a high percentage of DNS Server Failure packets, and
setting a threshold for these packets is also a challenge. For example, botmasters
can control the TTL values and the frequency of DNS requests to avoid Server
Failure errors, thus, a high threshold of Server Failure errors can be evaded by a
lower frequency and higher TTL (false negative). However, a low threshold may
result in a higher false positive.
Figure 12 shows the DF implementation. There were three IP addresses
(87.221.209.204, 109.73.179.95, and 185.1.62.82) assigned to four different
malicious domains (top-web.org, linetechservice.org, serviceline2013.org, and
servicewebcheck.org); the assignment was done in a “round robin” fashion. When
the DNS request (packet No. 15680) was sent, the IP addresses were not yet
assigned to serviceonline2013.org, thus, packet No. 15683 had a Service Failure
error since the TTL for serviceonline2013.org had expired.

Figure 12. Domain flux implementation.
Figures 13 illustrates the concept of FFSN; new IP addresses
(109.117.185.235, 91.230.157.174) had been used instead of 185.1.62.82.
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Figure 13. FFSN implementation.
3. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in Iodine. Figure 14 shows
the connection negotiation between the server and the client.

Figure 14. Iodine connection negotiation
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By analyzing the traffic from the Wireshark capture, it was noticed that Iodine
used some patterns or signatures in its negotiation between the server and the client.
These patterns were appended to the subdomain (tunnel.ialabs.net), and included
the following:
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The following figure shows the SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets. The
SSH connection initialization started at packet No. 4248.

Figure 15. SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets (iodine).
Iodine uses the NULL RR (QTYPE 10) and provides higher performance by
allowing the downstream data to be sent without encoding. Each DNS reply can
contain over a kilobyte of compressed payload data. However, regarding the
upstream date (the DNS requests), Iodine uses either Base-32 or a non-standard
Base-64 encoding method (based on a configuration option) (Nussbaum, Neyron, &
Richard, 2009).
By analyzing different SSH connections, the following signature was used to
establish a SSH tunnel:
eaba82.2hb..Y.w which is equivalent to following hex string:
\x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x59\xd6
\x77
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4. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in DNS2TCP. The following
figure shows the SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets. The SSH connection
initialization started at packet No. 4248.

Figure 16. SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets (dns2tcp).
By default, DNS2TCP uses the TXT RR type. Since DNS2TCP uses Base-64
encoding, SSH connection packets can be analyzed to find the encoded pattern of
the normal SSH connection. In a normal situation, a SSH connection contains the
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_ string. By analyzing packet No. 187 in figure 16, the string
AAACCFNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF83LjJwMiBVYnVudHUtNHVidW50dTIuMg0 was
used to establish a SSH tunnel. This string is equivalent to ��SSH-2.0OpenSSH_7.2p2 Ubuntu-4ubuntu2.2.
To detect other versions of SSH-2.0 connections and/or operating systems,
only the CFNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF8 part is used to detect SSH connections
tunneled in DNS packets. After decoding this Base-64 encoded string, it is equivalent
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to �SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_. To detect only OpenSSH_ string, only the string
T3BlblNTSF8 is used.
In BRO NSM, both Iodine and DNS2TCP queries were logged in DNS.Logs as
lowercase queries, so the detection script was written based on the lowercase
equivalents. For example, the string Iodine SSH tunnel eaba82.2hb..Y.w was
detected by the equivalent hex of its lowercase eaba82.2hb..y.w, which is
\x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x79\xd6\x77 instead

of \x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x59\xd6\x77. To
find the complete script for SSH tunneling detection, refer to Appendix D.
Summary
This chapter presented and analyzed the packet captures of DGA, FFSN, and
DF implementations, as well as SSH connections tunneled in DNS tunneling using
Iodine and DNS2TCP tools. The next chapter discusses the results, conclusion, and
future work.
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations
Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapters, DNS protocol can be implemented for
botnet communications. Some of these implementations utilize different evasion
techniques to circumvent the detection and prevention methods. In this study, the
multistage-detection technique was designed and implemented using the BRO
Network Security Monitor. This chapter presents the results of the analysis methods,
conclusion, and future recommendations.
Results
This thesis presents an empirical solution to detect DNS-based botnets at
different stages of their communications. Domain Generation Algorithm-based
botnets were detected by the percentage of unique NXDomain errors among the total
DNS queries within an epoch of 30 minutes. The fluxing techniques–FFSN and DF–
were detected by the percentage of total Server Failure errors among the total DNS
queries within an epoch of two hours.
Also, this thesis presents some popular DNS tunneling tools that are used to
tunnel botnet traffic in DNS packets, and presents a signature-based method to
detect DNS-tunneled botnets that use SSH as their encryption algorithm. Each tool
has different method to tunnel the traffic. Since SSH is utilized to encrypt the tunnel, it
is recommended to look for SSH connections wrapped in the DNS packets by looking
for the encoded patterns of the SSH connection requests. Some tools, such as
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Iodine, encoded the traffic using a non-standard Base-64 encoding method and other
tools like DNS2TCP using a Base-64 encoding method.
From the Iodine lab results, a non-standard encoded pattern for SSH
connections was detected. In the DNS2TCP lab, a standard encoded pattern for SSH
connections’ handshaking was detected. These patterns can be used as signatures
to detect SSH connection handshaking tunneled in Iodine and DNS2TCP tools.
The following questions and answers provide a summary of the proposed
solutions:
Question 1: Was the proposed method able to detect DGA-based botnets?
Answer: Yes, based on unique NXDomain thresholds.
Question 2: Was the proposed method able to detect FFSN- and DF-based
botnets?
Answer: Yes, based on Server Failure thresholds.
Question 3: Were the signatures able to detect SSH tunneling in the
suggested tools?
Answer: Yes, the signatures were able to detect SSH tunneling in Iodine and
DNS2TCP tools.
Organized and professional botmasters may develop other methods to bypass
these detection mechanisms. The following questions and answers explain:
Question 1: Can the botmasters evade the detection of the DGA-, FFSN-, or
DF-based botnets based on the NXDomain or Server Failure
thresholds?
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Answer: Yes, changing the frequency of the DNS requests will minimizes the
NXDomain errors within a specific epoch. Also, they may control the
TTL values properly to avoid the high number of Server Failure
responses.
Question 2: Can the botmasters evade the non-standard encoded signatures
of the SSH connection handshaking?
Answer: Yes. Like other characteristics and parameters in the DNS traffic, they
may change the non-standard encoding/decoding code.
Question 3: Can the botmasters evade the standard encoded signatures of the
SSH connection handshaking?
Answer: Creating a large set of possible strings of the encoded SSH
connection handshaking using the standard encoding methods
provides a strong mechanism for SSH tunneling detection. For
example, using Base-64, the encoded pattern of ANSSH-2.0OpenSSH_ is QU5TU0gtMi4wLU9wZW5TU0hf, but the encoded
pattern of ASSH-2.0-OpenSSH_ is QVNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF8=,
which is completely different, because Base-64 method takes every
three bytes and encodes them into four bytes output, so the order of
the OpenSSH_ string within the packet gives different outputs.
However, creating a signatures list provides a strong mechanism for SSH
connections tunneling detection; botmasters may change the trend to use nonstandard encoding/decoding methods to tunnel these connections.
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Conclusion
This thesis was to design and implement detection techniques for DNS-based
botnets at different stages of communications. Using a BRO Network Security
Monitor, the suggested solutions were able to detect the botnet traffic at the rallying
stage–when finding the C&C server–as well as, detecting the SSH tunneling
connections used to encrypt the traffic after finding the C&C server.
The detection of DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based botnets was based on a
threshold value of specific DNS response failures. Whereas, the detection of SSH
tunneling was based on encoded patterns of SSH connection handshaking within two
popular DNS tunneling tools. The suggested solutions were able to detect the SSH
tunneling in Iodine and DNS2TCP. These tools can be utilized to tunnel the SSH
connections in DNS-based botnets.
Future Work
In this thesis, tunneling SSH connections were implemented using two of the
most popular DNS tunneling tools. In the future, analyzing other tools that support
SSH connections, such as DNSCAT and OzymanDNS, and creating a large set of
possible strings of the encoded SSH connection handshaking using the standard
encoding methods will contribute to the detection efforts.
Regarding DGA and fluxing techniques, finding an automated way to set the
thresholds of DNS queries, NXDomain, and Server Failure based on the behavior of
the system will improve the detection mechanisms. The threshold settings need to be
dynamically adjusted with the changing nature of communication which would
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optimize false positives and negatives. Also, to minimize the false positive of fluxing
detection, the DNS Server Failure error–resulting from fluxing implementations–
needs to be differentiated from similar errors caused be other issues.
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Appendix A: DNA Message Format
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Appendix B: Iodine Lab Implementation
1- Create two Ubuntu instances on Amazon Web Services.
2- Assign static IP addresses to these instances.
3- Install Iodine on both instances
sudo apt-get install iodine

4- Configure the inbound traffic on the server to allow only the incoming DNS traffic.
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the server and
to the client only from my remote location.

Figure 17. DNS tunneling server firewall (inbound configuration).
5- Configure the inbound traffic on the client to block all incoming traffic.
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the client only
from my remote location.

Figure 18. DNS tunneling client firewall (inbound configuration).
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6- Block the outbound SSH traffic on the client.

Figure 19. DNS tunneling client firewall (outbound configuration).
7- Register a domain name (ialabs.net) and delegate a subdomain (tunnel.ialabs.
net) to the DNS tunneling server.

Figure 20. Domain name settings.
8- Using Putty, connect to the Iodine server at 52.52.65.253.
9- Run iodined on the tunneling server
sudo

iodined

-c

-f

-P

mysecret

tunnel.ialabs.net

Figure 21. Running iodined on the DNS tunneling server.

192.168.250.1
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Figure 22. Tunneling interface on the server (192.168.250.1).
10-

Make sure that tunnel is setup and working troubleshooting your iodine
setup.

Figure 23. DNS tunneling server troubleshooting.
11-

Using Putty, connect to the Iodine client at 35.165.67.21.

12-

Run iodine on the tunneling client
sudo iodine -f -P mysecret 52.52.65.253 tunnel.ialabs.net
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Figure 24. Running iodine on the DNS tunneling client.

Figure 25. Tunneling interface on the server (192.168.250.2).
13-

Run the following command
ssh ubuntu@192.168.250.1 -D 9999
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Figure 26. SSH connection tunneling (iodine).
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Appendix C: DNS2TCP Lab Implementation
1- Create two Ubuntu instances on Amazon Web Services.
2- Assign static IP addresses to these instances.
3- Install dns2tcp on both instances by running the following command:
sudo apt-get install dns2tcp

4- Configure the inbound traffic on the server to allow only the incoming DNS
traffic.
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the
server and to the client only from my remote location.

Figure 27. DNS tunneling server firewall (inbound configuration).
5- Configure the inbound traffic on the client to block all incoming DNS traffic.
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the client
only from my remote location.

Figure 28. DNS tunneling client firewall (inbound configuration).
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6- Block the outbound SSH traffic on the client.

Figure 29. DNS tunneling client firewall (outbound configuration).
7- Register a domain name (ialabs.net) and delegate a subdomain (tunnel2.ialabs.
net) to the DNS tunneling server.

Figure 30. Domain name settings.
8- Using Putty, connect to the dns2tcp server at 52.52.65.253.
9- Configure the dns2tcpd.conf as the following:

10- Using Putty, connect to the dns2tcp client 35.165.67.21.
11- Configure the dns2tcpc.conf as the following:

75

12- Run the dns2tcp server using the following command on the tunneling server:
sudo dns2tcpd -F -d dns2tcpd 2 -f /etc/dns2tcpd.conf

Figure 31. Running dns2tcp on the DNS tunneling server.
13- Run the dns2tcp client using the following command on the tunneling client:
sudo dns2tcpc -z tunnel2.ialabs.net 52.52.65.253 -f
/etc/dns2tcpc.conf

Figure 32. Running dns2tcp on the DNS tunneling client.
14- Run the following command on the tunneling client:
sudo ssh ubuntu@127.0.0.1 -p 8888 -D 8080
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Figure 33. SSH connection tunneling (dns2tcp).
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Appendix D: BRO Network Security Monitor Scripts
DGA Detection Script
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Figure 34. DGA detection–script output.
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FLUX Detection Script
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Figure 35. Flux detection–script output
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SSH Tunneling Detection Script

Figure 36. Iodine SSH tunneling detection.

Figure 37. DNS2TCP SSH tunneling detection.
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Appendix E: DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based Botnets Dataset

